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PARKHURST.

Couri of Abpjeals of New York.
MILLS el a. Appellants v. PARKHURST, as Assignee,
&c., el al. Respondents.
The doctrine of election between inconsistent remedies does not apply
to creditors who first assail an assignment for the benefit of creditors on
the ground of fraud, and, pending this action, or after its unsuccessful
termination, claim a dividend from the assigned estate.
A creditor may first test the validity of an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, and then make claim for his proportion of the assets after the assignment is sustained.

In January, 1884, Henry W. Perine was a member of the
finn of Perine & Co., of New York City, and also of the
firm of H. W. Perine & Co., of Bath, N. Y. On the twentyseventh of that month, the New York firm made an
assignment for the benefit of its creditors, and Henry W.
Perine, upon ascertaining the insolvency of the New York
firm, purchased the interests of his partners in the Bath
finn, with agreement to assume and pay the latter firm's
indebtedness.
On the thirtieth of January, Henry W.
Perine made an individual assignment for the benefit of
certain preferred creditors, and then for his individual
creditors and the creditors of his New York firm. Reuben
0. Smith, an individual creditor, reduced his claim to judgment after the assignment, and commenced a proceeding to
have the assignment declared void, by reason of the execution of certain prior mortgages and of the direction in the
assignment to pay individual creditors and the New York
firm's creditors with preference of the former: Smilk v.
Perine(1888), I N. Y. Supp. 495. Only the latter ground
is erroneously stated, by VAN BRUNT, P. J., in Mills el al. v.
Parkhurstet al. (189o), 9 N. Y. Supp. 1O9. This suit was
a failure in the lower courts, as was the case on appeal,
where only the former ground was argued: Smithl v. Perine
el al. (189o), 121 N. Y. 376 and per RUGII, C. J., page 381.
In February, 1886, while this adversary action was pending, Philo S. Mills and other creditors of Henry W. Perine
began an action for an accounting of the assigned estate,
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and a referee was appointed to state the account. Smith
proved his claim, before the referee, but with notice that he
did not waive any rights exercised in bringing the adversary proceeding, and that his proof of claim was intended
to protect his interest in the fund and to prevent final distribution until the decision of his appeal. On exceptions to
the report of the referee, the allowance of Smith's claim
was held to be erroneous: per O'BRIEN, J., in Special Term

of the Supreme Court for New York County (1889), 5 N. Y.
Supp. 730, 731; and VAN BRUNT, P. J., in General Term
(i89o), 9 N. Y. Supp. io9. The former put the point thus:
No citation of authority is necessary in support of the well-settled
proposition of law, that a creditor who proves his claim under an assignment, and accepts a benefit under it, elects thereby to ratify the assignment, and can never afterwards be heard to attack it, or maintain an
action to set it aside. Is the converse of this proposition good? %Villa
party who elects not to accept and ratify the assignment, but repudiates
it, and maintains an action to set it aside, be held to have made his election, and be precluded from claiming any benefit thereunder?
It is asserted that the reason for the rule in the converse falls, for it is
urged that in the one case the creditor is forbidden to attack an assignment which he has already ratified and confirmed, and under which he
has laid claim to certain rights; in the other, he is asking for that portion
of his claim which his creditor, in the instrument of assignment, has declared himself willing to pay, while seeking to determine whether or not
he be in law entitled to more.

The same learned Judge briefly reviewed Jewelt v. Woodward and Skeryy'eld v. Simonson (infra, pages 354, 356), and
erroneously, according to the Court of Appeals (infr'a, page
342) concluded, that:
While, therefore, the rule as to election, as applicable to voluntary
assignments for the benefit of creditors, is not as sweeping as with respect
to other instruments, as, for example, claims under a contract, as in
Hollerv. Titska (iSSi), 87 N. Y. 166, where the Court laid down the broad
rule that if a man once determined his election, it shall be determined
forever, nevertheless, in the absence of any express authority to the contrarv, I am inclined to think that on reason and principle the doctrine of
election should be applied to a case like this, so as to prevent a creditor
from holding at the same time two inconsistent positions, one in maintaining an action to destroy an instrument which in another action he
seeks to uphold. This is trying to repudiate and ratify at the same time.
Moreover, his hostile action compelled the expenditure of moneys, pre-

MILLS V. PARIKHURST.
vented the distribution of the estate for a long time, jeopardized the interests of all the other creditors claiming under the assignment, and,
while he could, when presenting his claims, by abandoning his appeal,
have had them allowed, he should be held to his election as standing in
hostility to the assignment, and the exception to the allowance of these
claims should be sustained: O'BRaI9, J., 5 N. Y. Supp. 732-3.

Benjamin S. Harmon, for appellants.
Humblhrey McMasler, for respondents.
GRAY, J., March 20, 1891. The first of the two questions
which were presented, relates to the right of the appellants
to come in and share in the distribution of the assigned
estate, and the argument against their right is, that in bringing and prosecuting the action to set aside the assignment
as fraudulent, they had thereby elected to repudiate the
assignment.
The doctrine of election, which has been thus far successfully invoked in support of the argument, does not seem to
be applicable to such a case, and no authority is found warranting its application. The learned Justices who considered the question at the Special and General Terms, were
influenced in their conclusions by the supposition that these
appellants were pursuing two remedies upon their claims
against their debtor, Perine, and that though direct authority might be wanting upon precisely such a case, Yet analogy
with adjudged cases, which hold that inconsistent remedies
may not be availed of, or concurrently pursued, required the
application of the doctrine of election in this instance. If
the definition of the legal position taken by these appellants
was correctly assumed below, we should have nothing to
say, and could not add to their opinion. But we cannot
agree with them in their view of the situation of the parties.
The elements required to make out a case of election were
wanting. The doctrine of election, usually predicated of
inconsistent remedies, consists in holding the party, to whom
several courses were open for obtaining relief, to his first
election ; where subsequently he attempts to avail himself of
some further and other remedy not consistent with, but con-
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tradictory of, his previous attitude and action upon his
claim. The basis for the application of the doctrine is in
the proposition that where there is, by law or by contract, a
choice between two remedies, which proceed upon opposite
and irreconcilable claims of right, the one taken must exclude and bar the prosecution of the other. An extended
citation of authorities illustrating the principle, in cases of
breaches of contract, or of a duty imposed by the law, would
be unprofitable here, because of many recent decisions of
this Court, and because not needed in the present discussion.
Where parties are under some contract, or the case is one of
a deed or of a will, an election is deemed to be made where
there has been an acceptance of a benefit, under the one or
the other, and the party benefited will not be heard to raise
the question of validity, nor to insist upon some other but
inconsistent legal rights, however well founded. So it is
conceivable that the rule may be so extended as to apply to
the case where a creditor comes in under an assignment by
his debtor for the benefit of creditors, in such way and with
such attitude as should preclude him from thereafter assailing its validity. But how can the converse of the proposition be sustained? The assignment by an insolvent debtor
is involuntary as to creditors in the application of his assets
to their claims and, it may be, unequal as well as unjust as
to some, and it is of no effect if fraudulently made, within
the meaning of the law. Shall the creditor, for endeavoring to set it aside on legal gi ounds, if unsuccessful, be held
incapable of receiving his share of the debtor's assets?
Such a rule could not be based upon equitable principles. It
would come so near to lending aid and encouragement to
attempts at fraudulent assignments, as to render its adoption
impossible.
The assignment is not like a gift of property upon conditions open to the acceptance or rejection of the donee. It is
a payment by the assignor of his debts after his own plan.
The deed of assignment is in no sense a contract between the
debtor and his creditors, and it does not depend for its validity in law upon their assent. It is a means or mode which
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the statute permits to be adopted by an insolvent debtor for
the distribution of his estate among his creditors, and so long
a he has acted without fraud, in fact or in law, and has complied with the prescriptions of the act, his conveyance to an
assignee, for the purpose stated therein, will stand and be effective. If the distribution is to be made unequally among
the creditors, and some are preferred to others in payment,
the assignment is not viewed by the Courts with any favor,
and is only tolerated and upheld when all conditions are met
for the prevention of fraud: Nichols v. McEwenz, 1858, 17
N. Y. 22. The debtor's proceeding sets at naught whatever
elements of superiority the non-preferred creditor's claim may
possess, as it may nullify the results of any diligent effort on
his part to secure his debt. It compels him to submit to inequality in payment and to take his firo rata share of the estate, unless he discovers and can establish its invalidity.
But, if he believes himself possessed of proof invalidating the
assignment, he is not debarred from attacking it and endeavoring to set it aside. He is then but insisting upon his
general right to be paid his judgment in the order of its
priority; and on what principle should his endeavor in that
direction prevent him from proving and establishing his
right, in any event, to his share in the assigned estate, which
the assignee must be deemed to be holding in trust for him
and all other creditors under the debtor's deed? The creditor
may not feel any more hostility to the debtor's proposed distribution of his estate, when he sues to annul it, than he did
before. The bringing of the suit is merely the hostility on
his part pronounced in legal proceedings. The learnedJustice delivering the opinion at the General Term conceded
that where an action to set aside the assignment had been
brought, and was unsuccessful and terminated, an election
would not be held to have taken place [szora, page 341].
How does the mere pendency of the action affect and change
the situation? What is the attitude of the parties? The
debtor has transferred his estate to another upon the trust
that he distribute it, in the manner provided in the deed, to
and among his creditors. The assignee is a trustee, whose
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duty it is to make that distribution. A creditor's only alternative, if he is not contented to take what would thus
come to him, is to endeavor to set aside the deed of assignment, if he deems himself possessed of the requisite evidence
of its invalidity at law. If there is any election for him to
make, it can only be with respect to what remedies may be
available to him in order to right himself upon his judgment against the assignor and to avoid the assignment.
We think, therefore, that this was not a case of election of
remedies; and that, in endeavoring to set aside the deed of
assignment in order to render their judgments effective, the
appellants were testing and contesting the legality and validity of their debtor's act and disputing its binding force upon
them, as they had a legal right to do, and which was a course
that recognized the debtor's deed, but alleged the existence
of grounds for holding it voidable and therefore not compulsory upon the creditor. It in no wise militated against
the right of the appellants, if defeated upon that issue, to
share in the assigned estate on the basis of distribution provided in the debtor's deed to his assignee.
The second question argued was whether the appellants,
if entitled tp share iu the distribution of the assigned estate,
could claim preference in payment under the assignment, as
being individual creditors of Perine. With respect to that
question, we agree with the decision of the Court below
denying that right. The indebtedness represented by
their claims was clearly excepted by the terms of the deed
of assignment, and they could only claim to share ratably
with other creditors after the payments previously directed.
So much of the judgment appealed from as affirmed the
judgment disallowing the right of these appellants to share
in the distribution of the funds in the assignor's hands should
be reversed and these appellants adjudged entitled to share
with other creditors not preferred in the assignment.
Costs to the appellants, to be paid out of the estate in the
assignee's hands.
All concur.

MILLS v. PARIXRST.
Hostility to an assignment may
be manifested either before or after
assent to the provisions of the
trust created for the creditors, and
it will be observed that this recent
New York case involves only the
former class of hostile creditors.
There seems little doubt of the
conclusiveness of assent to an
assignnfent upon any future hostility. Unfortunately, this conclusiveness has been placed on the
ground of election, as in Frierson,
Exr., elal.v. Branch,Exr. (1875),
30 Ark. 453, 457; Adlm v. Yard
(1829), I Rawle (Pa.) 163, though
in case of testamentary dispositions, no person will "be compelled to elect, unless his property
is attempted to be disposed of by
the testator" : Bisph. Eq. 302.
Hostility before assent, does not,
in every forum, prevent abandonment of that hostility and subsequent assent to the provisions of
the debtor's assignment for his
creditors. Before discussing this
difference between prior and subsequent hostility, it will be advisable
to examine the cases, and the
ostensible principles upon which
they have been decided. It will
also be found possible to classify
the decisions by their facts, and
thus test still further the soundness
of the principles proceeded upon.
Adverse claims against the assignedassets.
Several classes of such claims
may be observed, as, A4rst, a claim
founded upon conversion of the
creditor's money into specific property.
Such was Peters v. Bain
(iS9 o), 133 U. S. 670, decided by
the late ChiefJustice VAITE, in the
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The caseinvolved
the right of a receiver of a National
Bank to claim from an assignee for

the benefit of creditors such property as could be specifically proved
as having been purchased with the
Bank's money by the assignors in
default of their duty a. officers of
the Bank, and also the right of the
receiver to come in with the other
creditors upon the balance of the
fund. The Circuit Court allowed
both claims ofthereceiver, and the
Supreme Court, speaking by the
present ChiefJustice, affirmed these
claims, adding, that "The doctrine
of election rdsts upon the principle
that he who seeks equity, must do
it, and means, as the term is ordinarily used, that, where two inconsistent or alternative rights or
claims are presented to the choice
of a party, by a person who manifests the dear intention that he
should not enjoy both, then he
must accept or reject one or the
other; and so, in other words, that
one cannot take a benefit under an
instrument and then repudiate it.
It cannot be assumed that there
was an intention on the part of
Bain and Brother [the assignors], to
dispose of that which was not
theirs, or, even if they lawfully
could, to cut the Bank off from participating in the property assigned,
in the order [of preferencej mentioned, by imposing the condition
that the Bank should purchase its
share by parting with its own property; nor does any equitable implication to that effect arise. The
other creditors cannot claim compensation for being deprived of
what did not belong to Bain and
Brother, or of anything transferred
in lieu thereof. There existed no
equity on their part which couldbe
held to estop the Bank from receiving what may come to it under the
assignment, and in doing so, it will
not occupy inconsistent positions.
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That it sought to have the deed set
aside, does not deprive it of its
rights under it, upon the failure of
its attack."
This decision must be distinguished from the case supposed
by MITCHELL, J., Ini re Van Morman (infra, page 349), where objection to one provision was
thought to prevent any taking under the assignment. The property
here claimed in preference, was
distinguishable from the other assets, and was so claimed.
Second, a claim founded upon
disregard of the assignment by the
debtor himself, as in the case of the
Appeal of Golden el al. (1885), iO
Pa. 581, which arose from an unauthorized reconveyance by the
assignee to the assignor, followed
by a creditor's proceeding to have
the trust created by the assignment
enforced, notwithstanding the reassignment. The creditor's right
was denied, because she had
attached some of the assets after
the assignment, and thereby (so it
was argued), assented to the reassignment. The attachment had
neither been prosecuted nor abandoned. But this contention 'was
denied by STERRETT, J., delivering
the opinion of the Court: " Under
the circumstances disclosed by the
record, the issuing and service of
the execution attachment on the
administrators of James E. Browfi
cannot be considered a waiver by
the appellees [the creditor and her
husband] of their right to insist on
the enforcement of the trust. It
was doubtless prompted by the unauthorized reconveyauce of the
trust property, and resorted to for
the purpose of acquiring a lien on
the fund, in case the reassignment
should be adjudged effective for the
purpose of reinvesting the assignor

with title to the trust property":
Id. 587-8.
Jefferis' and Yearsiey's Appeals
(I859), 33 Pa. 39, cited in Efppright
v. A 'auffman (infra, page 355),
should be observed to prevent an
error. In this Pennsylvania case,
the creditors under a prior assignment claimed a preference over
creditors under a second assignment. Between the two assignments the debtor had become solvent, and had his property reassigned without paying these
creditors now claiming a preference. This preference was denied,
but no more. "As creditors, they
can claim under the second assignment, but their rights must be
measured by its provisions, and not
by those of the first assignment.
Claiming under one assignment,
they cannot hold the assignee to
duties prescribed by another and a
hostile one": LOWRIE, J., Id. 4o-i.
So that the substance of this case
is merely that creditors can claim
on the fund only through the assignment; they cannot claimfroin the
assignee in hostility to the assignment: Geist's Appeal (1884), 104
Pa. 355 and citations. That is, the
creditors "have relinquished nothing in compensation of the benefits of the trust. They have not
agreed to look to it for satisfaction
of their claims. They have no
title to the property assigned. They
acquired a right oniy to enforce the
duty undertaken by the assignees:
BE RCUR, J., Vrighl el aL v. Wigton (1877), 84 Pa. 163, 166 and
citations.
Third, a claim may be prosecuted
against the assigned assets, to obtain a priority not allowed by law
under the assignment. In this
class should be marshalled the New
York case under annotation, and
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a similar case in Minnesota, growing out of the failure of Van Norman Brothers, of Minneapolis, Minnesota. On the last day of December, I883, J. H. Purdy & Co. issued
an attachment out of the State
court against the goods of Van
Norman Brothers and a seizure
was made.
During the same day
the defendants made an assignment
to Charles C. Bennett, for the benefit of their creditors, and their assignee obtained a surrender of the
possession which had been taken
by the sheriff under the attachment.
Also on the same day, another
creditor, the firm of Lapp & Flershem, issued an attachment from
the United States Circuit Court for
District of Minnesota, and the Marshal proceeded to eject the assignee
and take possession of the assets
under hiswrit: MILLER, J., Dennly
v. Bennett (1888), 128 U. S. 489,
493, though this order of time seems
doubtful: HARLAN, J., Id. 501.
The assignee, upon application,
was allowed to intervene in thislatter attachment, but his motion to
dissolve was refused: Lapp!i v. Van
Norman (884), 19 Fed. Repr. 406.
It was not shown that the assignee
did actually appear in this attachment, which was prosecuted to
judgnent and a sale of the attached
property: MILLER, J., Denny v.
Bennett (1888), 128 U. S. 489, 493,
and MITCHELL, J., In re Van Norman (I889), 41 Minn. 494, 495.
During the pendency ofthis attachment proceeding, the assignee
brought a suit in the State Court
against the United States Marshal,
for the conversion of the attached
goods. A verdict recovered against
the Marshal, was sustained on appeal to the State Supreme Court:
Bennett v. Denny (1885), 33 Minn.
53o, and again on appeal to the

Supreme Court of the United
States: Denny v. Bennett (1888),
128 U. S. 489.
Lapp & Flershem
then paid the judgment against the
Marshal and presented their claim
to the assignee for allowance. The
time for presenting their claim
had not expired, and the estate had
not been distributed, so that the
question of time, which was so important in Lovenberg v. Bank
(infra, page 352), did not arise.
The assignee disallowed the claim,
and in this Was approved by the
State District Court, but the State
Supreme
Court, speaking by
MITcHELL, J., thought otherwise,
saying: "It is not pretended that
there is any provision in the insolvent law, debarring a creditor from
proving his claim under such circumstances. Hence, if appellants
are debarred, it nmust be on the
ground that they had elected to
pursue an inconsistent remedy, or
to claim an inconsistent right. It
was exclusively on this ground that
the Court below bases its decision,
and this is the only ground urged
here by the respondent" [the assignee]: In re Van Norman (1889),
41 Minn. 494, 495-6.
The Court immediately went to
the foundation of the controversy,
by denying that the doctrine of
election had any application to the
facts of the case.
"The appellants never, in fact, had any election of rights or remedies. This
action was a mere futile attempt to
assert a right which they never possessed, in which they were defeated and compelled to make restitution to the insolvent estate of
what they had wrongfully withheld
from it. If the appellants were
claiming a benefit under one provision of the assignment, which
was advantageous to them, but ob-
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jecting to another provision as invalid, which was against their
interest, we can see how the familiar principle might apply, that one
who accepts a benefit under an
instrument must adopt it as a
whole, and cannot adopt the part
beneficial to him and reject the
rest [supra, page 3473. Or if the
assignment had been voidable, at
the election of the appellants, * *
Or if the appellants still held the
proceeds of the assigned property,
and the suit against the Marshal
was still pending and undecided,
we can see why this might be good
ground for disallowing their claim,
under the familiar maxim that a
'party cannot blow hot and cold at
the same time' [i/ra, page 351).
Or, again, if the appellants had
prevailed in their [defense of the]
suit against the Marshal, and then
elected to retain the property, and
rely on their attachment, rather
than on the provision made for
them in the assignment, this would
doubtless have amounted to a
waiver and disaffirmauce of the
trust" These dicta are valuable
for comparison with the cases in
the other States, where they have
been uttered as points of decision,
foz the Court proceeded to declare,
under limitation, what should- be
the true rule in all cases; that is:
"But none of the cases supposed,
are at all analogous to the case at
bar, which is simply one where a
party has made a fruitless attempt
to assert a right which he never
possessed, and, being beaten, has
made full restitution and compensation for the wrong which he
committed. The rule is as undoubted as it is familiar, that where
a party has inconsistent rights or
remedies, he may claim or resort
to one or the other, at his election,

and that when once made, his election is irrevocable. But we think
it is equally true that a mere
attempt to pursue a remedy, or
claim a right, to which a par-ty is
not entitled, and without obtaining
any legal satisfaction therefrom,
will not deprive him of the benefit
of that which he had originally a
right to resort to or claim; and
this proposition, if sound, fully
covers the case."
With reference to an objection
to this principle, which was made
a part of another judicial utterance (inifra, page 35o), the Court
continued: "Considerable stress is
laid upon the supposed injustice of
allowing a creditor who contests
the validity of the assignment, delays the distribution of the estate,
and puts it to the expense of protracted litigation, when defeated,
to come in and share in the benefit
of the assignment equally with
creditors who have all the time
occupied a friendly attitude. In
view of the policy and purposes of
the insolvent law, it might have
been advisable for the legislature
to have incorporated in it some
provision similar to that attempted
to be applied in this c2se; but they
have not done it, and the courts
have no right to do it. And we
know of no principle of law which
imposes upon a party any other or
greater penalty for attempting to
assert a right to which he is not
entitled, than the judgment for
damages and costs awarded against
him in the action": MITCHEL, J.,
In re VanNorman (I889), 41 Minn.
497. This is a clearer statement of
the underlying principle of the
New York decision here annotated,
than made by that Court, and is
certainly not answered by any of
the cases to be considered later
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(pages 351-352).
Jones v. Tilton (1885), 139 Mass.
418, has been cited (in Drew Glass
Co. v. Baldwin) as establishing the
impossibility of both attacking and
claiming under the assignment;
but this was allerroneous citation,
as the creditors did not lose their
claim upon the assets, though they
endeavored to enforce an attachment issued subsequent to the
assignment. Assent was given to
the assignment after the attachmeat had ,been issued, and "such
assent, if given before the commencement of an action, would
debar the plaintiffs from making an
attachment, and, being given afterwards, must defeat the attachment " : C. ALLEN, J., page 420.
Of the cases which declare that a
creditor cannot claim under an assignment after opposing or seeking
to invalidate it, Valentine et al. v.
Decker, assignee (1869), 43 Mo.
583, cited in Eppright v. Kauffman, (infra, page 355),,was an instance where the plaintiffs had full
notice of the assignment and the
regularity of the proceedings under
it, yet they attached the assets,
and giving bond, ordered their sale
by the Sheriff. The assignee then
commenced suit on-this attachment
bond, and also refused to recognize
the claim of the plaintiffs on the
day appointed for the allowance of'
demands against the estate. The
assignee was upheld in this action,
WAGNER, J., delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, that
"although a deed be made for a
party's benefit, his assent will be
presumed, still this presumption is
not absolute or conclusive, for the
law will not force a party into a
contract against his will. Therefore,, he may, if he will, reject or
repudiate an assignment; and he

cannot claim a benefit under it, and
at the same time attack it for fraud
and attempt to destroy its validity.
He must make his election, and
either take under it or disclaim it."
Passing to the safer ground of the
particular case, the Court characterized the action of the plaintiffs
thus: "If they succeed in their
proceeding, they swallow up and
appropriate the assets; but, if they
fail, can they be permitted, after'
having sacrificed the goods, perhaps at a forced sale, and accumulated costs of their litigation, to
come in on an equality with the
other creditors for a !ro ratashare?
The very proposition is monstrous,
and its bare statement carries with
it a sufficient refutation. If such a
course is approbated, it will hold
out inducements to creditors to attach, and, if they are successful,
they will sweep the entire estate, to
the total exclusion of all others; if
not successful, they lose nothing,
for they come in equally with the
others. Such proceedings can meet
with no favor in a court ofjustice ":
Id. 585. This reads savagely besides the temperate judgment of
MITCHELL, J., or the more logical
reasoning of GRAY,J., in the principle case (supra, pages '349, 343)This principle, however, was supposed to have been followed, in an
"analogous" case, by MARTir, C.,
in Stoller el al.v Coates, assignee
(I885), 88 Mo. 514, 523, where a
claim for a specific sum as a trust
fund was refused because adividend
had been received. This was supposed to be an election which prevented any further claim for trust
funds.
Valentine v. Decker was again
cited in The F. A. Drew Glass Co.
v. Baldwin, by the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, June 6, 1887 (27
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Mo. App. 44), where the attachment had issued the day before the
assignment. The plaintiffs secured
the allowance of their claim upon
the assigned estate, and then undertook to press their attachment, but
failed by the overruling of their demurrer to the assignee's interplea
of the facts just mentioned. PHILLIPS, P. J., delivering the majority
opinion, thought the analogy of a
mortgage creditor valuable, as "It
thus becomes manifest to my mind
that thelaw contemplatesno absurd
results and contingencies in its administration. It will not permit a
party to occupy such inconsistent
positions in the prosecution of his
rights. He ought not, with the
judicial sanction, to be allowed to
play with the other creditors the
unequal game of' heads I win, tails
[Compare the dicta of
you lose.'
MITCHELL, J., and his subsequent
remarks, sUlpra, pages 348, 349.]
He must either affirm the validity
of the deed in loo, or stand out on
his asserted prior, exclusive right.
His attachment, in the very nature
of the case, is antagonistic to the
assignment. If it stands, there is
nothing for the assignment to operate on. It is wholly unlike the instance of a prior mortgage or equitable lien. There the prior right is
founded on contract-the assent of
the debtor to create the lien ": Id.
51.
E,LISON, J., dissenting, took the
more reasonable though narrow
ground, that the assignment had
been made subject to the attachment, as this had issued the day
before the assignment. Hence,
even if the doctrine of election
could apply, "the time had not yet
arrived at which the defendant
should be compelled to exercise
that right. The doctrine of elec-

tion, though sometimes applied at
law, is of an equitable nature, principally exhibited in cases of wills,
and rests, more or less, upon equitable principles, and it appears to
me to be unjust and inequitable, to
compel a prior attaching creditor,
to elect between bis attachment
and the assignment, before the
attachment has been passed upon":
27 Mo. App. 61.
This dissent was supported,
among other citations, by the last
resolution of the Court in ANew
England Bank v. Lewis el al.
(ifra,page 356), where the action
involved an attachment on the
assigned goods. WILDB, J., delivering the opinion, confined himself to the case before him, and
pointed out that "It is not, however, made a condition of the trust
that the plaintifis should discontinue their suit, nor does it appear
that the defendants in that suit,
either expected or wished it to be
done. They insisted on their defense to the action, and eventually
prevailed. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs had a right
to proceed to trial, with the view
of saving themselves from costs.
If they had prevailed in their
action, and had then elected to
rely on the attachment rather than
on the provision made for them in
the deed of trust, this, undoubtedly, would have amounted to a
waiver and disaffirmance of the
trust. But merely prosecuting the
action to final judgment, cannot,
we think, have any tendency to
show a waiver of the trust": 8
Pick. (Mass.) 12O-1.
Sampson v. Shaw (1885), T9 Mo.
App. 274, was also decided upon
the authority of Valentine v.
Decker. There, a chattel mortgage
had been made to secure certain
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notes, and on the next day, the
mortgagor executed an assignment
for the benefit of his creditors. The
mortgagee presented a claim to the
assignee, with written notice "that
the validity of said mortgage has
not been tested in the courts, but
will be, and should it be decided in
favor of said Sampson [the mortgagee], the above notes will be paid
in full without calling on any funds
in the hands of the assignee; otherwise he presents said claims to be
allowed and paid as other claims."
This was held to be an election to
claim under the mortgage, though
the mortgagee would be, none the
less, a creditor and a cestui que
trust. This injustice is more especially to be observed in Douglass
v. Cissna (188 5 ), 17 Mo. App. 44,
where a deed of assignment was
immediately followed byan attachment issued under the erroneous
idea that the deed was void because
preferring on- creditor. The Court
concluded, on a motion for a reargument, that: "It is, therefore,
with little grace that plaintiffs now
complain, if their attachment is not
maintained they will lose all, as
they cannot be admitted to share in
the distribution under the assignment after assailing it," citing
Valentiue v. Decker, and adding
" Duos qui sequitur lepores, neutrum capit."
Lovenberg v. Bank (1887), 67
Texas 44o, was a case where the
principles of Valentine v. Decker
were approved, though the exclusion of the attaching creditor was
accomplished by strict construction
of the time within which the claim
could be proved. The circumstances were enough to excite the
judicial ire, as the creditor forcibly
removed the assets from the assignee's hands and vigorously con-

tested under a chattel mortgage,
void under assignment law, all legal
efforts for their recovery by the assignee until finally compelled to
hand over the value of the estate.
After this litigation had terminated,
claim was made upon the assets as
by a consenting creditor.
The
Court were also influenced by AcKindley v. Nourse, assignee (188 5 ),
24 N. W. Repr. 750, where the Supreme Court of Iowa had denied
a creditor the right to participate.
The creditor had attempted to rescind a sale of goods to the assignor, and took them away from
the assignee by a replevin.
Eventually, the assignee won the
replevin suit, and then the creditor
sought to claim under the assignment, upon the plea that the commencement of the replevin was
sufficient notice. This was denied
by SEEvRS, J. "On the contrary,
the plaintiff did not seek payment
of the claim through the assignee or
from the assignment. Thevalidity
of the assignment of the goods replevied was denied, and the plaintiff undertook to recover the whole
value of the goods, instead of sharing 'with the other creditors. Having taken the chances, and, because
of the choice made, failing to exhibit or file the'claim within the
time required by law, the plaintiff
must abide the consequences."
The cases considered thus far
under this subdivision were caused
by the action of the creditors whose
relation to the assignment was
simply that of creditors. But there
may be action taken against the
assigned assets by a creditor who is
also the trustee in the deed of
assignment. Such was the circumstance of Harrison&c. v. Block et
aL. (1846), 1o Ala. 185. It is necessary to observe the exact circum-
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stances of the case, and their recital by ORMIOND, J., in delivering
the opinion of the Court: "The
slaves Hagar, Aaron, Eliza, Nancy
and her child, stand upon a different footing. They were sold by
direction of the trustee, in June,
1842, nearly a year after the bill
was filed [against the trustee, for
an execution of the trust by paying
the creditors], to satisfy judgments
which he [the trustee] claimed the
right to control, and at the sale he
became himself the purchaser.
This was a breach of his duty as
trustee. The deed devoted the
slaves and other property to the
payment of all the creditors, in
equal proportions, and he cannot
be permitted to do an act beneficial
to himself, and injurious to the
rest of the creditors, whose interest he had undertaken by the acceptance of the trust to protect.
The sale being made at his instance,
and for a purpose not authorized
by the deed, is voidable. [The
Court continues, though the facts
are otherwise stated in the report
of the second appeal, in 16 Ala.
619, and also to support an application of the doctrine of election, by
ExGIISH, C. J., in Frierson,Exr.
et al. v. Branch, Exr. (1875), 30
Ark. 453,461-] It does not appear
that the executions under which
the sale was made, were liens upon
the slaves when the deed was executed ; nor are we able to perceive
that it would alter the case, if such
was the fact. The deed provided
for the payment of all the creditors
ratably, if the property was not
sufficient to pay all, as was the fact
here, and by accepting the trust,
the trustee consented that his own
claim should be thus apporioned.
He, in effect, waived his lien, and
Vor. XXX-23
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consented to come in as a general
creditor, except so far as he was
preferred by the deed. * * His
purchase, therefore, of these slaves,
must be considered to have been
made by him in his character of
trustee, and for the benefit of those
concerned in the trust." This resolution was supported by citation
of Hawley v. Afancius (1823), 7
Johris. Ch. (N. Y.) 584, and Rogers
v. Rogers (1825), Hopk. Ch. (N.
Y.) 523, and was followed when the
case came before the State Supreme
Court in 1849: 16 Ala. 616-24.
The former of these two citations
was a similar case, before the distinguished Chancellor KENT, of
New York. The judgment lien,
however, was against real estate
and prior to the assigment, but the
principle involved was the same;
that is, "to take out an execution
upon the judgment against the
property over which they are exercising a discretion a-.d control as
trustees, would be incompatible
with a due discharge of the trust,
and a manifest breach of it. They
are bound, therefore, to seek for
satisfaction of theirjudgment in the
mode presented by the terms of the
trust which they have accepted":
7Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 185. Itwould
be a blunder to speak of trustees
electing between their office and
their personal advantage, in the
se-se of that doctrine of equity.
The second citation, by Judge ORmoND, was the case of an executor
who was also a judgment creditor,
and, of course, Chancellor SANDFORD applied the proper principle,
in these words: "A trustee can give
no advantage to himself, to the
detriment of those for whom he
holdshistrust. * * * Thisdoctrine is undoubted; and ithas often
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been enforced in this Court. Itwas
fully examined by the late Chancellor [KmNT], in the case of Davoue
against Fanning (1&16), 2 Johns.
Ch. (N. Y.) 252. In that case, the
late Chancellor traced the -reasons
of this doctrine and- clearly displayed its foundations. [The present Chancellor then proceeds to
sum these reasons of KrNT in unmistakable language--] This -rule
is founded in the 'most salutary
policy.
It justly considers the
trustee, as holding an office not for
his own advantage, but for the benefit of the true owners of the subject
held in trust. The objects of thd
rule are, to secure fidelity on the
part of the trustee, and to preserve
the interests of those whose rights
are confided to his care. To effect
these objects, equity does not inquire for fraud on the part of a
trustee who attempts to purchase
the subject of his trust; but it removes temptation, by declaring
him incapable of making a purchase which shall bind those 'for
whom he -is entrusted; and it gives
to them the option to vacate or
affirm the purchase of their trustee,
* * This rule imposes no hardship on the trustee : it prevents collision between his interest and his
duty; and it precludes a difficult
and uncertain inquiry into his motives. It is necessary for the security of those whose property is held
in trust; and it produces practical
and effectual justice":/ Hopk.
Chan. 524-5.
Hence it is not the doctrine of
election at all, which applies to
creditors who assume the duties of
assignees or trustees, but the much
more general rule of fidelity to the
purposes of the trust by the trusted
fiduciary. As a consequence, the
trustee was allowed to share pro

rata with the other creditors: 16
Ala. 616, 623. And these things
are remarkable, as this case was
cited as authority for refusing a
dividend to a creditor who was not
the assignee, and who had merely
pressed a prior attachment before
claiminghis dividend: per PHILIPS,
P. J., in Drew Glass Co. v. Valdwin (supfra, page 351)." Of course,
the case is not authority for such a
ruling.
Reference is sometimes made in
this connection, to the remarks of
WVAS11INGTON, J., in Prevost v.
Gratz et al. (i16), Peters C. C.
37.3, where he said that "A court of
equity will not permit a person,
acting as a trustee, to create within
himself an interest oprosite to that
of his cesiti que trust or principal.
But this doctrine is inapplicable to
the case of a fair bonafide creditor,
who became so priorto the assumption of his fiduciary capacity. In
such a case, he is entitled to claim
the full amount of -what was due
from his cestui que trust, &c., and
the latter has no right to inquire
how much the former paid for it;
so, too, the trustee &c. 'may pursue all legal remedies for enforcing
payment of the debt, which would
have been open to him if he had
not become a trustee." This language was not used in or with regard to the class of cases here considered, and may be passed without further remark than that no
hostile or destructive action towards
the trust is supposed. Such rights
as existed prior to the assignment,
still remain, though their owner
has become the assignee or trustee.
Fourth,the creditors may attempt
to repudiate the assignment, as
they did in Jewett v. Woodward
(1831), x Edw. Chan. (N. Y.) 195.
Vice-Chancellor McCOwN thought
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that "This seems to have been an
unnecessary and rather a vexatious
proceeding; but I do not perceive
how the creditors, by so doing, deprived themselves of a right to
come in and claim under the assignmehit, provided the proceedings
proved unavailing, or they thought
proper to abandon them. The
doctrine of election does not apply
to a case like the present, where
the question is merely as to the
remedy or mode of proceeding. If
one remedy fails, the party may
oftentimes resort to another. Nothing is more common than to leave
a party to his bill in equity, after a
fruitless attempt at law; and, vice
versa. I am of opinion there has
been no waiver or abandonment of
the right to come in under the
assignment and ask for a distribution of the trust funds." In the
case under annotation, the Judge
at the Special Term thought these
sentiments to have a restricted application to cases when the creditors
had abandoned their adverse proceedings (supra, page 341).
Attack on assets not assigned.
Epprightv. Kauffman (1886), 9o
Mo. 25, was a case where the creditor claimed under the assignment,
and also attacked what he supposed
to be assets of the assignor which
had not passed to the assignee.
The case reached the State Supreme
Court on account of the refusal of
the assignee to pay the dividend
awarded to the creditor, upon the
mistaken impression that the creditor's adverse action had forfeited
his right to the dividend. SHERWOOD, J., delivering the opinion of
the Court, noticed Valentine v.
Decker,and Jefferis' Appeal (suira,
pages 350, 347), and added: "But
I have found no case going to the
length of saying that where, as

here, the claim of the creditor has
passed in remjudicatam,his rights
therein or thereto can be effected or
overthrown in consequence of his
subsequently recovering judgment
for the amount of his allowed
claim, and then attempting, by
legal proceedings, to have that
judgment satisfied out of what, at
the time, were not considered as
passing as assets into the hands of
the assignee by reason of the assignment." The authority of this case
cannot be extended beyond its
facts, as the Court was unfortunate
enough to add, that: "There is a
wide difference, I take it, between
a direct attack upon an assignment
as for fraud, etc., and acasewhere a
claim is presented and allowed before the assignee, and the claimant
afterwards endeavors, by legal
measures, to reach such assets as
seemed to be beyond the reach of
the assignee. There is certainly a
distinction to be taken between
direct attack and mere inadvertence": Id. 29. This language
is weighty, as the decision has
since been cited as authority for
the proposition that the assignee's
action in allowing or refusing a
claim, is a judgment, conclusive
and appealable from as other judgments, by SHERWOOD, J., Nanson

v. Jacob (1887), 93 Mo. 331, 344,
and NORTON, C. J., Roan v. Winn,
Id. 503, 512.

Adverseproceedings against the
debtor.
Such proceedings have been considered as affording no reason for
excluding the creditor from participation in the assigned assets.
Generally speaking, a judgment
against the debtor, obtained even
after the assignment, unless by collusion, will serve to fix the exact
amount of the claim, and ought not
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to diminish the rights of the credId. 536-7.
itor. To. -this, several objections
Second, it was thought by the ashave been raised: thus,first, it is
signees, as early as i829,'in New
England Bank v. Lewis et al., 8
said that the judgment has merged
the claim, and so merged it that the
Pick. (Mass.) 113, 117, that the
right to prove under the assign- prosecution of the action was a rement is cut off by reason of the jection of the assignment, and,
judgment being a demand arising
therefore, a claim presented to the
subsequent to the assignment.
assignees, subsequent to judgment,
This contention was denied in The
could be met with the old plea of a
Second NVational Bank of Rich- former recovery. This was denied,
inondv. Townsend, assignee (I888),
though the decision of the Supreme
114 Ind.534,where the Court below Judicial Court was closely confined
excluded a judgment, as well asthe to the facts before them, and these
notes on which it was founded,
facts were peculiar in that the judgfrom participation in the assets of ment set up in bar was adverse to
an assigned estate. This was re- the plaintiffs on the mere ground of
versed, on appeal, because " Equity
suit before cause of action accrued:
always refuses to permit a merger
New EnglandBank v. Lewis et al.
(1824), 2 Pick. (lass.) 125. Hence
where it will work injustice. In
this instance, this equitable prin- the judgment was f"no bar, either
ciple should be applied. The act
at law or in equity": WILDE, J.,
of the creditor, in reducing his -8 Pick. (Mass.) 118.
claim to judgment, neither prejuNew York Cases.
diced the rights of any other credAfter the repudiation by the
itor, nor interfered with the adminCourt of Appeals, of any application
istration of the trust. The debt re- - of the doctrine of election to actions
mains ; the evidence is, it is true,
by creditors against the assigned
assets, two cases in the inferior
changed into a new and higher
form, but the appellant is still a
courts of New York become of little
creditor. * * * Equity looks
future value beyond their historical
through form to substance, and the position as having preceded the
substance to which it will- here final declaration of the law in that
look, is that the appellant was a ,State. One of these cases is Sterncreditor when the assignment was feld v. Simonson (1887), 44 Hun.
made, and continued a creditor, al(N. Y.) 429, from which O'BRinm,
though the form of the evidence of J., in the Supreme Court stage of
his debt was changed. * * *
the principal case (vide, supra,page
We hold that, although the notes 341) drew the inference that if the
action hostile to the assignment
were merged as a causd of action,
an incidental right, such as the
there taken, had been pending inright to share in the trust funds in
stead of fruitlessly ended, the unthe hands of the assignee, was not successful creditor could not have
even technically merged in the claimed on the assigned estate and
judgment. Incidental rights and
brought his action against the
equities of that nature were not
bondsmen of the assignee. But
this inference is not properly
litigated, and were not concluded by
the judgment, and there can, there- drawn, as the case fell within the
fore, he no merger ": ELLIOTT,J., second of the two classes dis-
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tinguisbed in this annotation
(supra,page 346). "In fact, long
before the issuing of the attachment, the plaintiffs had elected to
proceed under the assignment, and
their proceedings to examine the
assignor and assignee, in regard to
the property, and in respect to the
amount ofthe bond which it would
be proper for the assignee to give
in the Court of Common Pleas,
might have been a complete answer
to their proceeding by attachment,
upon the allegation that the assignment was made with intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors, as they had elected to assert
rights under the assignment itself,
and after having made such election, they could not attack it upon
the ground offraud": VAN BRUNT,
P. J., 44 Hun. 432.
Iselin v. Henlein (1885), 16 Abb.
New Cases (N. Y.) 73, probably
caused the judgments in the court
below in the principal case, though,
curiously enough, it is not cited.
This case was cited by VAx BRUNT,
P. J., in Sternfeld v. Simonson, but
merely to distinguish it. In this
Iselin case, the defense was, in
part, acquiescence in the assignment arising out of a compromise
proposed after the assignment.
This compromise was not carried
out within the time fixed by the
plaintiffs for giving their assent to
it. After the expiration of the time
so fixed, the plaintiffs, in January,
1884, issued an attachment against
the assigned assets, on the ground
of fraud, and their attachment was
held to be valid: Viclorv. Henlein
(1885), 7. N. Y. Civ. Proc. 69.
"The plaintlffs, in August, 1884,
proved their debt and filed the
same with the assignee. But they
annexed to their proof, a statement
that they did not thereby waive

any rights they may have acquired
under their attachment, and they
added, 'nor do we recognize in any
manner, the validity of said general
assignment, unless the same is held
to be valid and binding against
Us"': VAN VOR , J., 16 Abb. New
Cases (N. Y.) Si. This action was
similar to that of the creditor in
Sampson v. Shaw (supra, page
352), and the New York Judge dedared "the intentional qualification," was no admission of the
validity of the assignment. The
action, therefore, proceeded and the
assignment was declared void.
Judge VAN VCRST apparently decided the case upon the absence of
an equitable estoppel, the creditor
not misleading and the assignee
not being misled by the claim on
the assets. And this seems farmore
reasonable than speaking of an election between contrary rights or
remedies, when it is not the remedy
chosen by the hostile creditor or
the right asserted, but his acceptance of the assignment, that is the
test. Those cases which proceed
upon the test of an election, virtually put a premium upon fraudulent assignments by excluding an
attacking creditor from all participation in the assets. Every creditor, in the jurisdictions where this
principle prevails, is put to an
between proving or
"election"
submitting to a fraud ; and this because some creditors have failed to
established a fraud which did not
exist. Thus the greater evil is
there preferred over the lesser.
The discussion of the difference
between assent to an assignment
before testing its validity, and assent after such legal scrutiny, will
not now appear to rise from a mere
question of priority of action or assent, but from a general principle
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involved in the assent of the creditor
to a voluntary assignment.
This
larger discussion involves also a consideration of the cases where assent
has first been given, and then hostil-

ity undertaken.
Such consideration
must be postoned to a subsequent
page of this magazine.
JOHN B. UHLE.

NOTE.-It is a curious fact that
Adams, in his book on Equity, treats
of the doctrine of election as if it was
confined to wills. He says: "It has
been stated as a general principle
that the equity to enforce contracts
made for value, is extended by parity
of reasoning to cases where a benefit
has been conferred as the consideration for an act, and knowingly accepted, although the party so accepting it
may be bound by an actual contract,
or by a condition of perfomance annexed to the gift. (Edwards v. Grand
.7unction Railway, i Al. & C., 65o;
Green v.
Green, 59 Ves. 665; 2
Meriv., 86; Gretton v. Haward, i
Swanst. 409, 427.)
The equity of
election is analagous to this. It applies not to cases of contracts or of
conditional gifts, but to those on
which the donor of the interest by
will has tacitly annexed a deposition
to his bounty, which can only be
effected by the donor's assent, e. g.,
where a testator. leaves a portion of
iis property to A, and by the same
will disp -ses of property belonging to
A." (P. 92.) There ia,not a word
concerning any other kind of election.
Mr. Bispham in his work on Equity
(Section 295) gives a clear statement of the doctrine of election. He
says: "An election in equity is a
choice which a party is compelled to
makebetween the acceptance ofa ben-

efit under an instrument, and the
retention of some property already
his own, which is attempted to be disposed of in favor of a third party by
virtue of the same instrument. The
doctrine rests upon the principal that
a person claiming under an instrument shall not interfere by title paramount, to prevent another part of the
same instrument from having effect
according to its construction; he cannot accept and reject the same instrument.

Streafield v.

Streafield, I

Lead Cases, Eq. 333, and notes: Codrington v. Lindsay, L. R. Ch. App.
578; Stepihens v.Stephlens, 3 Drew, 697 ,
701 ; Hall v. Iall, I Bland, x3o; Clay
v. Hart,7 Dana i ; Brown v. Rickets,
3 Johns Ch. 553 ; Marriott v. Sam
Badger, 5 Maryl. 3o6; Van Dnj'ne v.
Van Dnyne, I McCart, 49; Gable
v. Daub, 4 Wright (Pa.) 217; Reaves
v. Garrett, 34 Ala., 558; Brown v.

Pitney, 39 Ill. 468. It is a doctrine
which is principally exhibited in
cases of wills ; but it has been applied,
also, to cases of voluntary deeds
for value resting upon articles, to
cases of contracts completely executed by conveyance and assignment.
Codringonv. Lindsay, L. R. 8 Ch.
App. 587; Anderson v. Abbot, 23
Beav. 457; Brown v. Brown, L. R. 2
Eq. 481 ; WVilloughby v. Middle/on, 2

Johns and H. 344.

DUNCAN V. M'CALL. .

Szreme Court of the United States.
DUNCAN v. McCALL, Sheriff.
Where a petitioner to a Circuit Court of the United States, prays for a
habeascorpus, under the Fourteenth Amendment, upon the ground that
certain State Statutes were not legally enacted, and it appears that the
State court has jurisdiction and is exercising it over the petitioner, the petition should be denied and the petitioner put to his writ of error.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Western District of Texas.
Thos. j Mcfinn, A. H. Garland.and Heberi MOfa, for
appellant.
R. H. Harrison,Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
FULLER, C. J., March 30, r891. Dick Duncan was indicted by the Grand Jury of Maverick County, Texas, for
the crime of murder, and, having been arraigned, was tried
in the District Court of that County and State, found guilty,
and his punishment assessed at death, and the Court entered
judgment accordingly, from which he appealed to the Court
of Appeals. He was thereupon committed to the jail of
Bexar County, upon the ground that there was no safe jail
in Maverick County, McCall, the appellee here, being Sheriff
of Bexar County at the time. While the case was pending
on appeal, and on the tenth of April, 189o, Duncan filed in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas his petition for a writ of habeas corfius, to be
discharged from custody, on the ground that he was deprived
of his liberty and about to be deprived of his life in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
The petition set forth the finding of four indictments for
murder against petitioner, his arrest, trial, conviction, and
sentence, and copies of the record were attached. It was
alleged that petitioner was deprived of his liberty without
due process of law, and denied the equal protection of the
laws, because the "Penal Code and Code of Criminal Pro-
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cedure" of the State of Texas, now and since July 24, 1879,
recognized as law, under which his alleged trial was conducted, were not enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Texas, and that the definitions and rules in the supposed
Codes were materially different from the definitions and
rules of procedure prevailing before their alleged adoption.
The petition then averred that the Codes failed of enactment
on these grounds, in substance: That the bill which contained them was not referred to a committee and reported on
in the House, and was not read on three several days in each
House, as required by the State Constitution; and although
the Legislature dispensed with the reading of the printed
matter in extenso, and provided for a consideration on three
several days, the bill was not so considered; that the two
Houses of the Legislature never agreed to or came to a common legislative intent on the passage of the bill; that
neither House of the Legislature kept a journal of its proceedings, as required; that an abortive attempt was made to
dispense with enrollment, and there was no enrollment of
the bill, or any substitute therefor; that there is no record
in existence by which the accuracy of said statutes can be
verified; that the Legislature attempted to delegate legislative
power to one Lyle, who proceeded to embody the alleged
Codes into a printed book, the volume known as the "Revised Statutes of Texas"; that the said volume is not a
copy of or identical with the bill said to have been passed
embodying them, but is widely variant therefrom, and from
the original bill on file in the office of the Secretary of State;
that the alleged law set out in the Revised Statutes was
never considered or passed by the Legislature of the State,
nor considered by the Governor, and did not become a law;
that the printing, binding, distribution, and codification of
the volume known as the "Revised Statutes" was never
duly or legally authorized, and that the entire 'system of
penal and civil laws is involved.
It was further alleged that the Court of Appeals of Texas
was organized on the sixth of May, 1876, and that the
judges selected to sit upon the bench of that Court were
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elected on the third Tuesday in February, prior to the organization of the Court; that the present presiding judge of
the Court was at that time elected, and has since continuously
succeeded himself; that the Court is interested in the determination of the questions involved, because the statutes
supposed to have been adopted, attempted to make new and
important provisions for the exercise of jurisdiction and
judicial power by the Court, and the civil statutes, which
fixed the salaries of judges, determined the jurisdiction of
certain judicial districts, and regulated the method of election of judges in the State, were attempted to be enacted at
the same time and mainly in the same manner as above set
forth; that a decision by any 'court of Texas upon the
questions presented would tend to disturb the alleged and
recognized legal system and Code of laws of said State, and
cloud the title to office of the judges of the State, and subject the courts to severe criticism, and that petitioner has
cause to fear that the courts of Texas would be unduly
influenced to his prejudice.
The differences between the prior statutes and codes and
those of 1879, which petitioner claimed operated to abridge
his rights, privileges, and immunities as a citizen of the
United States, and to deprive him of due process of law,
seem, as he sets them up, to be that, by the prior law, the
punishment of murder in the first degree was death, and the
jury could not assess the punishment, so that imprisonment
could not be inflicted if the crime were of that degree,
whereas this could be done under the later law; that, by the
prior law, grand juries were composed of not less than sixteen persons, while by the later, twelve was the number,
though this was prescribed by Section 13, Article V, of the
Constitution; that challenges to the array were allowed
under the prior law for corruption in the summoning officer,
and the willful summoning of jurors with the view of securing conviction, whereas, under the later law, while the jurors
called upon the trial had been selected by jury commissioners
in accordance with a law to that effect enacted in 1876, the
challenge to the array was not allowed, but it was not
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averred that petititioner attempted to challenge the array;
that under the prior law the indictment must charge the
offense to have been "felonious" or done "feloniously,"
whereas, under the Codes of 1879, these words might be
omitted, as they were in this instance; and that, under the
prior law, sheriffs were prohibited from summoning any
person as a juror found within the court house or yard, if
jurors could be found elsewhere, but that some of the jurors
who tried him were so summoned, although, other jurors
could have been found in the county.
The Sheriff of Bexar County filed exceptions to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and assigned, among other
reasons, that the petition showed upon its face that the matters in controversy did not arise under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States, nor did the adjudication or determination of the same involve a construction
thereof, but that the matters arose solely under the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas, and their determination
involved exclusively the construction of the State Constitution and laws ; that it did not appear from the petition that
petitioner was restrained of his liberty and illegally held in
custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of
the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a
court thereof, or that he was in custody in violation of the
Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States; and
that the Circuit Court had no power or jurisdiction to release petitioner from custody, inasmuch as he was held by a
duly authorized and qualified officer of the State, under and
by virtue of a judgment of a court of the State, in and by
which he had been tried, convicted, and adjudged guilty of
a crime against the laws of the State, as appeared from the
facts set forth in the petition. And the respondent further
excepted, upon the ground that the petition was wholly inadequate and insufficient to authorize the relief sought,
because it appeared from its allegations that the petitioner
was arrested upon an indictment charging him with the
commission of the crime of murder, in violation of the
laws of the State; that he was arraigned and duly tried and
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convicted of the crime as charged, and was by the court, in
accordance with the verdict, sentenced, and was now held to
await the execution of that sentence, unless reversed by the
Court of Appeals of Texas, wherein the case is now pending on appeal from the court below; and that even if the
validity of the present Penal Code and Code of Criminal
Procedure of Texas were legitimately assailed, yet the petition was wholly insufficient, because there was no allegation
that the provisions of the old Code, which in such an event
would have remained in force, were in the least dissimilar
from the present, or that he would have been tried in a
different way, or that he would have or might have received
a different or lesser punishment.
May 14, 189o, the Circuit Court, on hearing the application, dismissed the petition and denied the writ. From that
judgment petitioner appealed to this court.
By Section I, Article V, of the Constitution of Texas, the
judicial power of the State was vested "in one Supreme
Court, in a Court of Appeals, in District Courts, in County
Courts, in Commissioners' Courts, in courts of Justices of
the Peace, and in such other courts as may be established by
law." By Section 3, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
was confined to civil cases; by Section 6, it was provided
that "the Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction,
co-extensive with the limits of the State, in all criminal
cases of whatever grade;" and by Section 8, that "the
District Courts shall have original jurisdiction in criminal
cases of the grade of felony." The District Court of Maverick County was created and organized by an act of the
Legislature of Texas approved March 25, 1887: Laws Tex.
1887, p. 46. It had jurisdiction to try the offense of which
petitioner was accused, and acquired jurisdiction over his
person and the offense charged against him, through the indictment and his arraignment thereon. He was charged
with the commission of the crime of murder, which lie did
not deny was a crime against the laws of Texas, and that
the penalty therefor was death. What he complained of in
his application to the Circuit Court was that in the matter
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of indictment and trial he had been subjected to the provisions of statutes which had not been enacted in accordance
with the State Constitution. The District Court had jurisdiction and the power to determine the law applicable to
the case, and, if it committed error in its action, the remedy
of petitioner was that of which he availed himself, namely,
an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State. Under
these circumstances, the Circuit Court properly declined to
interfere: ExParteRoyall (1886), 117 U. S. 241, 245, 255;
Exfiarte Faida(1886), 117 U. S. 516.
Nor does the contention of counsel iii respect to the
Court of Appeals justify any other conclusion.
Under
Sections 5 and 6 of Article V of the State Constitution, the
Court of Appeals was created as a court of last resort in
criminal matters, its powers and jurisdiction defined, and
the salary, tenure of office, and qualifications of its judges
prescribed. The determination of the validity or invalidity
of the Civil or Penal Codes of 1879 would in no respect
affect that Court in these particulars, if the extraordinary
claim of counsel in this regard wele entitled to any consideration whatever in this proceeding. Unquestionably it
is a fundamental principle that no man shall be judge in his
own case, and the Constitution of Texas forbids any judge
to sit in any case wherein he may be interested, or where
either of the parties may be connected with him by affinity
or consanguinity within such degree as may be prescribed
by law, or wheie he shall have been counsel in the case; and
specific provision is made for commissioning persons to hear
and determine any case or cases in place of members of the
Supreme Court or Appellate Court, who may be therein
thus disqualified: Cost, Article V, § xi.
But no such question arises, or could arise, upon this record.
The Constitution of the State of Texas was submitted by
the Convention which framed it to a vote of the people, on
the third Tuesday of February, 1876, for their ratification or
rejection, by an ordinance passed for that purpose; and it
was provided that, if ratified, it should become the organic
and fundamental law of the State on the third Tuesday of
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April following; and also that, at the same time that the vote
was taken upon the Constitution, there should be a general
election held throughout the State for all State, district,
county and precinct officers created and made elective by the
instrument; and that, if the Constitution were ratified, certificates of election should be issued to the persons chosen:
Jour. Const. Con. 772, 78o. The Constitution was ratified,
and the petition alleged that the judges of the Court of
Appeals were elected to their positions on the third Tuesday
in February, 1876, and that the Court of Appeals was organized on the sixth of May of that year, from which counsel
argues that the conclusion should be drawn that the present
members of that Court are not even officers defacto. The
suggestion requires no observation here.
We repeat that, as the District Court had jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner and the offense with which
he stood charged, it had jurisdiction to determine the applicatory law, and this involved the determination of whether
particular statutory provisions were applicable or not, and
hence, if the question were properly raised, whether a particular statute or statutes had been enacted in accordance
with the requirements of the State Constitution.
It is unnecessary to enter upon an examination of the ruling in the different States upon the question whether a
statute duly authenticated, approved, and enrolled can be
impeached by resort to the journals of the Legislature, or
other evidence, for the purpose of establishing that it was
not passed in the manner prescribed by the State Constitution. The decisions are numerous, and the results reached
fail of uniformity. The courts of the United States necessarily adopt the adjudication of the State courts on the subject: Town of Soutk Ottawa v. Perkins (1877), 4 Otto (94
U. S.) 260; Post v. Supervaisors (1882), 15 Otto (1O5 U. S.)
667; Railroad Co. v. Georgia (1879), 8 Otto (98 U. S.)
359. In Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins,where the existence of a statute of Illinois was drawn in question, Mr. Justice BRADLEY, delivering the opinion of the Court, said (94
U. S. 268):
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As a matter of propriety and right, the decision of the State courts on the
question as to what are the laws of a State is binding upon those of the
United States. But the law under consideration has been passed upon by
the Supreme Court of Illinois, and held to be invalid. This ought to have
been sufficient to have governed the action of the court below. In our
judgment it was not necessary to have raised an issue on the subject, ex-.
cept by demurrer to the declaration. The court is bound to know the law
without taking the advice of a jury on the subject. When once it became
the settled construction of the Constitution of Illinois that no act can be
deemed a valid law unless, by the journals of the Legislature, it appears to
have been regularly passed by both Houses, it became the duty of the
courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that regard. The
courts of Illinois may decline to take that trouble, unless parties bring the
matter to their attention ; but, on general principles, the question as to
the existence of a law is a judicial one, and must be so regarded by the
courts of the United States. This subject was fully discussed in Gardner
v. Collector. After examining the authorities, the Court in that case lays
down this general conclusion : "That whenever a question arises in a
court of law of the existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute
took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the judges who are called
upon to decide it have a right to resort to any source of information which
in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such questions ; always seeking, first, for that which in
its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a different rule" : (1868), 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 511. Ofcourse, anyparticularState
may, by its Constitution and laws, prescribe what shall be conclusive evidence of the existence or non-existence of a statute; but, the question of
such existence or non-existence being a judicial one in its nature, the
mode of ascertaining and using that evidence must rest in the sound discretion of the court on which the duty in any particular case is imposed.

And it has been often held by State courts that evidence
of the contents of legislative journals, which has not been
produced and made part of the case in the court below, will
not be considered on appeal: RailroadCo. v. Wren (1867),
43 Il. 77 ; Bedard v. Hall (i866), 44 Id. 91 ; Grob v. Cashman (1867), 45 Id. ii;
Hensoldl v. Petersburg(1872), 63
Id. 157; Auditor v. Haycrafi (1878), 14 Bush. (Ky.) 284;
Bradey v. West (1875), 6o Mo. 33; Coleman v. Dobbins
(1856), 8 Ind. 156.
The distinction is recognized between matters of which
the Court -will take judicial cognizance "immediately, suo
motu," and those which it will not notice "until its attention
has been formally called to them ": Gres. Eq. Ev. (2 ed.)
*395, *408. As to the last, Mr. Gresley says:
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It will not point out their applicability nor call for them, but if they are
once put in by either party it will investigate them, and will bring its own
judicial knowledge to supply or assist their proof, and will then adopt
them as its own evidence, independently of the parties.

Jon1es v. U. S. (1890), 137 U. S. 202, 216.
As a statute duly certified is presumed to have been duly
passed until the contrary appears (a presumption arising in
favor of the law as printed by authority, and, in a higher degree, of the original on file in the proper repository), it would
seem to follow that wherever a suit comes to issue, whether
in the court below or the higher tribunal, an objection resting upon the failure of the legislature to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution should be so presented that
the adverse party may have opportunity to controvert the
allegations, and to prove by the record due conformity with
the constitutional requirements: Peoble v. Sziperisors
(1853), 8 N. Y. 325.
By the Constitution of Texas, each House of the Legislature must keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish the
same, and the yeas and nays of either House on any question
shall, at the desire of three members present, be entered on
the journals (Article III, § 12); no law shall be passed except
by bill, and no bill shall have the force of law until it has
been read on three successive days in each House, and free
discussion allowed thereon, but in case of imperative public
necessity (which necessity shall be stated in a preamble or
the body of the bill), four-fifths of the House in which the
bill may be pending may suspend this rule, the yeas and
nays being taken on the question of suspension, and entered
upon the journal (Sections 30,32); no bill shall be considered
unless it has first been referred to a committee and reported
thereon; and no bill shall be passed which has not been
presented, referred, and reported at least three days before
final adjournment (Section 37); the presiding officer of each
House shall, in the presence of the House over which he presides, sign all bills, and the fact of signing shall be entered
on the journals (Section 38); no law passed by the Legislatare, except the general appropriation act, shall take effect
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or go into force until ninety days after the adjournment of
the session at which it was enacted, unless in case of an
emergency the Legislature by a vote of two-thirds otherwise
direct, said vote to be taken by yeas and nays and entered
upon the journals, and the emergency to be expressed in a
preamble or the body of the act (Section 39). By the law
prior to 1876, the journals of the respective Houses were required to be furnished to the public printer, for the purpose
of being printed, by the clerical officers of each House (Pasch.
Dig. Art. 4872); and the Secretary of State was required to
distribute the printed journals (Id. Art. 5b92); and similar
provision was made by the Act of June 27, 1876 (Laws Tex.
1876, p. 36), as also by the Revised Statutes of 1879 (Rev.
St p. 677, §4012, et seq.). When printed, the manuscript
journals were to be returned and filed in the archives of the'
Legislature (Pasch. Dig. Art. 4872; Laws. Tex. 1876, p. 36).
It was the duty of the Secretary of State to keep, publish,
and distribute the laws (Pasch. Dig. Arts. 5091, 5092, 4872,
et seq.; Laws Tex. 1876, pp. 35, 313 ; Rev. St. 1879, pp.
395, 577, §2722, et seq.).
The Revised Statutes of Texas, containing the Code in
question, were officially published in 1879, with the certificate of the Secretary of State as to the date when the law
enacting them went into effect, and that the volume was a
true and correct copy of the original bills on file in his department. For eleven years prior to the conviction of
Duncan, these Codes had been recognized and observed by
the people of Texas; had been amended by the Legislature,
and republished under its authority; and their provisions
had been repeatedly construed and enforced by the courts as
the law of the land. In Usener v. Slate (i88o), 8 Tex. App.
177, the validity of the Penal Code in respect of its adoption by the Legislature was passed upon and the law upheld;
and that case was quoted with approval in Exfjarle Ti'tou,
28 Tex. App. 438, a decision rendered as late as February,
189o. This decision ruled that an authenticated statute
should be regarded as the best evidence that the required
formalities were observed in its passage, and that the courts
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would not exercise the power of going behind it and inquiring into the manner of its enactment; and Blessing v. Galveston (1875), 42 Tex. 641; Railway Co. v. HIearne (I87O),
32 Id. 547, and Day Land, etc., Co. v. State (1887), 68 Id.
526, were cited in support of the proposition. In one of
these cases, it was decided that the judicial department
should not disregard and treat as a nullity an act of the
Legislature, because the journals of one or both Houses
failed to show the passage of the bill in strict conformity
with all the directions contained in the Constitution; and in
another, that it would be conclusively presumed that a bill
had been referred to a committee, and reported on before its
passage, as required by the Constitution. The language of
the Court in State v. Szw /t (1875), 1o Nev. 176, was quoted
approvingly in Usener v. State, and repeated in Ex iarte
Tiflton:
Where an act has been passed by the Legislature, signed by the proper
officers of each House, approved by the Governor, and filed in the office of
the Secretary of State, it constitutes a record which is conclusive evidence
of the passage of the act as enrolled. Neither the journals kept by the
Legislature, nor the bill as originally introduced, nor the amendments
attached to it, nor parol evidence, can be received in order to show that
an act of the Legislature, properly enrolled, authenticated, and deposited
with the Secretary of State, did not become a law. This Court, for the
purpose of informing itself of the existence or terms of a law, cannot
look beyond the enrolled act, certified to by those officers who are
charged by the Constitution with the duty of certifying and with the duty
of dcciding what laws have been enacted.

In Usener's case, the Court declared that although not in
duty bound to do so, yet it had nevertheless examined the
journals of the two Houses, with regard to the bill entitled
"An Act to adopt and establish a Penal Code and Code of
Criminal Procedure for the State of Texas," and arrived at
the conclusion that the Act had received the legislative
sanction in strict conformity with the Constitution, so that,
if driven to such examination, the Court was unhesitatingly
of opinion that there would be no difficulty in the way of
establishing that fact by them in every essential particular.
VoL. XXX-24
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It is insisted that the extent of the disregard of constitutional requirements was not fully developed in that case, and
that its authority was overthrown by Hunt v. State (1886),
22 Tex. App. 396. But we are not called on to conclude
how this may be, or to anticipate the ultimate judgment of
the courts of Texas, if they consider the controversy still an
open one. If the question of the invalidity of the Codes
was presented to the District Court of Maverick County, it
must be assumed that it adjudged in favor of their validity;
and, as the case has been carried to the Court of Appeals,
that it will there be adjudicated in accordance with the law
of the State; and when so determined, it is entirely clear
that that adjudication could not be reviewed by the Circuit
Court or by us, on habeas cor5us. And the result must be
the same if the question has not been raised by the petitioner
in the State courts.
We may remark in conclusion that the magnitude of the
operation of the objection to these statutes does not affect
the principles by which the result is reached. This is not
the case of a system of laws attacked upon the ground of
their invalidity as the product of revolution. By the Constitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to
every State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of
that form is the right of the people to choose their own
officers for governmental administration, and pass their own
laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of
the people themselves; but, while the people are thus the
source of political power, their governments, National and
State, have beeil limited by written Constitutions, and they
have themselves thereby set bounds to their own power, as
against the sudden impulses of mere majorities.
In Luther v. Borden (1849), 7 How. (48 U. S.) I, it was
held that the question which of the two opposing governments of Rhode Island, namely, the charter government or
the government established by a voluntary convention, was
the legitimate one, was a question for the determination of
the political department, and when that department had de-
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cided the courts were bound to take notice of the decision,
and follow it; and also that, as the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, holding constitutional authority not in dispute, had decided the point, the well-settled rule applied,
that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the
decisions of the State courts on questions which concern
merely the Constitution and laws of the State. Mr. Webster's argument in that case took a wider sweep, and contained a masterly statement of the American system of government, as recognizing that the people are the source of all
political power, but that, as the exercise of governmental
powers immediately by the people themselves is impracticable, they must be exercised by representatives of the people; that the basis of representation is suffrage; that the
right of suffrage must be protected and its exercise prescribed by previous law, and the results ascertained by some
certain rule; that through its regulated exercise each man's
power tells in the constitution of the government and in
the enactment of laws; that the people limit themselves in
regard to the qualifications of electors and the qualifications
of the elected, and to" certain forms of the conduct of elections; that our liberty is the liberty secured by the regular
action of popular power, taking place and ascertained in
accordance with legal and authentic modes; and that the
Constitution and laws do not proceed on the ground of revolution, or any right of revolution, but on the idea of results
achieved by orderly action under the authority of existing
governments, proceedings outside of which are not contemplated by our institutions: 6 Webster's Works, p. 217.
Discursive as are the views of petitioner's counsel, no
violation of these fundamental principles in this instance is
or could be suggested. The State of Texas is in full possession of its faculties as a member of the Union, and its legislative, executive and judicial departments are peacefully
operating by the orderly and settled methods prescribed by
its fundamental law. Whether certain statutes have or have
not binding force, it is for the State to determine, and that
determination in itself involves no infraction of the Consti-
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tution of the United States, and raises no Federal question
giving the courts of the United States jurisdiction. We
cannot perceive that petitioner is being otherwise dealt with
than according to the law of the land.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
The rule (if rule it can be called)
that the Federal courts are governed
in their construction of State laws,
whether statutory, common or constitutional, by the decisions of the
judicial tribunals of the State, was
first applied in kcfeen v. Delancy's
Lessees, &c. (1809), 5 Cranch (9 U.
S.) 22. In that case, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had construed the words "justice of the
peace," to include a justice of the
Supreme Court. The Federal court
followed this construction, saying:
"Were this act of 1815 now, for
the first time, to be construed, the
opinion of this Court would certainly be that the deed was not
regularly proved. A justice of the
supreme court would not be deemed
a.justice of the county, and the
decision would be that the deed
was not properly proved, and
therefore not legally recorded.
But in construing the statutes of a
State on which land titles depend,
infinite mischief would ensue,
should this Court observe a different rule from that which has been
long established in the State; and,
in this case, the Court cannot
doubt that the courts of Pennsylvania consider a justice of the
supreme court is within the description of the act."
The rule was applied without
discussion in Polk v. Wendell (1815),
9 Cranch (13 U. S.) 87, and Thatcher
v.Powell (1821), 6WVheat. (19 U.S.)
119.
In Elmendorf v. Taylor (1825),
io Wheat. (23 U. S.) 152, Henry

Clay and Chancellor Bibb seem
to have argued the question as if
one of first impression, with the
result that the venerable Chief
Justice reaffirmed the rule, and
stated with his usual clearness and
cogency, the reasoning which supported it: "This course is founded
upon the principle, supposed to be
universally recognized, that the
judicial department of every government * * is the appropriate
organ for construing the legislative
acts of that government."
Enlarging upon this general principle
of jurisprdcnce, he concludes:
"If, then, this question has been
settled in Kentucky, we must suppose it to be rightly settled."
In Swigt v. Tyson (1842), 16
Peters (41 U. S.) I, Justice STORY,
who had concurred in Elmendorfv.
Taylor, ignored completely the
reasons announced in that case as
the basis of the rule and declared
that it found its authority in Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
(now
721,
Rev. Stat. U. S.).
Standing upon this new foundation,
the Court said: "It has never been
supposed by us that the Section
did apply or was designed to apply
to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon
local statutes or usages of a fixed
and permanent operation, as, for
example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments and especially to questions of general commercial law,
where the State tribunals are called
upon to perform like functions as
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ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon
general reasoning and legal analogies what is the true exposition of
the contract or instrument, or what
is the just rule furnished by the
principles of commercial law to
govern the case."
This novel
statement as to The origin of the
rule passed unchallenged by the associates of Justice STORY, most of
whom had participated in the
opinion in the EhnendorfCase and
the exception thus introduced has
been affirmed in Carpenter v.
Providence & Ins. Co. (1842), I6
Pet. (41 U. S.) 495; Carrollv. Carroll'sLessee (1853), i6 How. (57 U.
S.), 275; Walson v. Tarpley (1855),
18 How. (59 U. S.) 517; Oates v.
Nat'lL'ank (187 9 ), 1o Otto (io U.
S.) 239 ; Brooklyn 6-c. R. R. Co. v.
Nat'l Bank (iSSo), 12 Otto (102 U.
S.) r4 ; Arorton v. Shelby Co. (i886),
118 U. S. 425, and seems to be too
firmly established to be drawn in
question.
This exception is an exceedingly
unfortunate one, introducing as it
does two kinds of law in the same
community, one administered by
the State courts, the other by the
Federal tribunals. Its reasoning is
squarely opposed to that found in
fackson v. Chew (1827), 12 Wheat.
(25
U.
S.)
153;
W1"ilcox v.
Hunt (1839), 13 Pet. (,38 U. S.) 378
(decided before Swi/t v. Tyson),
and Bucher v. R. R. (,888), 125 U.
S. 555. In the last case, the Court
adopted the Sunday law of Massachusetts as a defense against an action brought by a party who had
been injured while traveling on
Sunday, in violation of the Sunday
law.
The next exception is that the
Federal courts will not permit the
construction of the Constitution or
statutes of a State in such a way as
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to disturb vested rights in contracts
protected by the Federal Constitution.
This exception has been
brought into being almost entirely,
by the efforts of State legislat6rs to
withdraw from creditors the protection or assistance of laws existing
when the contracts were made.
Butz v. Aluscatine (1869), 8 Wall.
(75 U. S.) 575, is the leading case
under that head, followed in Walker
v. Whitehead (1873), 16 Wall. (83
U. S.) 314, the Virginia Copozon
Cases (1885), 114 U. S. 269, and restrained somewhat in Supervisors
v. U. S. (I867), 4 Wall. 71 U. S.)
435. When the subject of consideration is a contract between
States, the rule does not apply:
Alarlall v. Silk (1837), 11 Pet. (36
U. S.) i; Jefferson Br. Bank v.
Skelly (1861), 1 Black (66 U. S.)4436.
It was held by the majority of the
Court in Williamson v. Berry
(i85o), 8 How. (49 U. S.) 495, that
the rule did not apply where the
act under construction was for the
benefit of a private party. The dissenting opinion by NE.SON, J.,
concurred in by the Chief Justice
and Justice CATRON-, strenuously
combatted this limitation as we
think with the better reason. Why
the Federal courts should be bound
by the exposition of the State
courts dealing with a law affecting
allwithin itsterritory and notwhen
one person only was interested, is
somewhat difficult of comprehension. The same title came back to
the Court in Suydam v. Williamson
(i86I), 24 How. (65 U. S.) 427, and
the Court, in an unanimous opinion, disregarded the ground of the
former opinion and reversed the
trial court for following the last deliverance of the highest Federal
Court and declining to adopt in its
stead the decision of the State
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court. The opinion is an admirable example of the manner in
which the greatest tribunal in the
world reverses itself without seeming to do so; as it were, in naive
unconsciousness of former conclusions. Dicta are neverbinding:
Carroll v. Carroll'sLessee (1853),
16 How. (57 U. S.) 275.
Burgess v. Seligman kiS83), 17
Otto (107 U. S.), 20, attempted to

establish the exception that where
contract rights have arisen under
statutory or constitutional provisions which had not been construed
by the State tribunals, the Federal
courts are not bound to acquiesce
in subsequent determinations of the
State courts. This limitation upon
the rule has been carried to such
astonishing lengths that a few of
the cases maybe especially noticed.
In the Seligman Case, the question
was whether the defendants were
liable as stockholders for the debts
of a corporation, their exemption
from such liability arising directly
upon the construction of the Statute
of Missouri, regulating that subject.
BRADLEV, J., says: "The Federal
courts have an independent jurisdiction in the administration of
State laws, co-ordinate with, and
not subordinate to, that of the State
courts, and are bound to exercise
their ownjudgment as to the meanjng of and effect of those laws."
With this view of the relation of
the Federal courts to the States, he
proceeds to examine and reject, unhesitatingly, the construction which
the Supreme Court of a sovereign
State had put upon its own laws.
In CarrollCo. v. Snmt1h (IS84), III
U. S. 556, this departure was apapplied to the construction of the
Constitution of the State of Mississippi, with a like result. There
the Supreme Court of the State had
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held that certain provisions of the
Constitution of the State meant so
and so. The Federal Court declining to adopt that view, said:
"When therefore it [the decision
of the State court] is presented for
application by the courts of the
United States, in a litigation growing out of the same facts, of which
they have jurisdiction by reason of
the citizenship of the parties, the
plaintiff has a right, under the Constitution of the United States, to
the independent judgment of those
courts, to determinefor themselves
what is the law of the State, by
which his rights are fixed and governed." Olcollv. TheSupervisors,
supra, should be considered in this
connection. Here the courts of
Wisconsin had held that taxation
for a certain purpose was unconstitutional, the purpose notbeing public. The Federal Court declined to
admit as Chief Justice MARSHALL
did, "that the judicial department
of every government was the appropriate organ for construing the
legislativeactsofthat government,"
or as was stated so clearly by the
same learned Judge, in Bank oJ
Hamiltonv. Dudley's Lessee (1829),
2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 492: " The judicialdepiartment of every government is the rightfl ex-pcsilor of its
laws and empihalically of its supreme law."
In Beauregardv. City of Arew
Orleans (I856), IS How. (59 U. S.)
497, the predecessors of Justice
BRADLEY

said: "They

(i. e., the

Federal courts) administer the laws
of the State and to fulfill that duty
they must find them as they exist
in the habits of the people and in
the expositions of their constituted
authorities." In WJilcox v. Hunt
(0839), 13 Peters (38 U. S.) 378, the
Court speaking of the trial Federal
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court sitting in Louisiana, calls it,
in so many words, a court of that
State, saying that those who "go
into the courts of Louisiana must
take their chances there."
In
Leflngwell v. Warren (1862), 2
Black (67 U. S.) 599, the Court
said the construction given to a
statute of a State by the highest
tribunal of such State, "is regarded
as a part of the statute and is as
binding upon the courts of the
United States asthe text" of it. If
the construction placed by the
courts of Wisconsin and Mississippi
upon their Constitutions becameII a
part of the text," then there was no
duty left the Federal courts but to
apply the plain unambiguous text
of those instruments.
These are the only recognized
limitations upon the rule under
consideration. There remains however, properly to be considered in
this connection, the attitude which
the Federal courts have assumed
when the decisions of a State court
have not remained consistent with
each other. Whether having once
adopted the construction of the
State courts, they are bound to
change with their changes and
whether, if the reversal be intermediate, the trial in the inferior
Federal court and the hearing of
the appeal, it shall be reversed because not in accord with subsequent State decision, are questions
which have arisen not a few times.
As to the inquiry whether the Federal courts have once adopted the
decision of the State courts, shall
change with their changes, Green
v. -ANeal's Lessee (1832), 6 Pet. (31
U. S.) 291, is perhaps the best considered case. The reasons which
led to the adoption of the decision
of the State courts in the first instance are there declared to be
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equally cogent in favor of conforming to the altered views of the State
authorities, and this view led, in
that case, to the overruling of the
former decisions (Patton'sLessee v.
Easton, i816, I Wheat., 14 U. S.,
476, and Powell'sLesseev.Harmen,
1829, 2 Pet., 27 U. S., 241), which
rested upon earlier decisions of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, and
the reversal of the Circuit Court
for adhering to those decisions.
This determination was, however,
expressly made with reference,
" not to a single adjudication but to
a series of decisions, which shall
settle the rule." Pease v. Peck

(1856), iS How. (s9 U. S.) 595,
found the same Court when it had
first decided a question, declining
to surrender its convictions on account of a subsequent decision to
the contrary by the State courts.
MIorgan v. Curlenius (1859), 2o
How. (61 U. S.) i,affirmed the decision appealed from, although between the trial in the Circuit Court
and the hearing on appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois had overruled the very case on which the
trial court rested its conclusion, the
reason given being that the later
decision of the Supreme Court of
the State could not "make that erroneous wvh ich was totso when the
judgment of the court was give,.."
Almost thirty years before, in U. S.
v. Morrison (83o), 4 Pet. (29 U. S.)
124, the Federal Circuit Cotrt va
reversed upon the sole ground that
the Supreme Court of the State had
subsequently held otherwise; while
in M7oores v. Arat'l Bank (iSSi), 14
Otto (Io4 U. S.) 625, the Circuit
Court was again reversed upon the
express ground that the trialcourt
erred in its jtdmnenl, because the
S. Areme Courl ofthe S/ate hadsubsequently construed the statute dif-
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ferently. In the last case, the Court
declined to examine the question
independently at all and reversed it
solely on the strength of the subsequent decision of the Supreme
Court of Ohio.
In the Morgan Case, supra, the
Court examined for itself the position taken by the trial court, and
finding it conform to their views,
they declined to say it was erroneous
because the highest tribunal of the
State, charged with the duty of construing the laws of the State, had
held otherwise. Rowan v. Runnels
(1847), 5 How. (46 U. S.) 34, is
another instance of construing the
statutes of a State independently of
its tribunals. Having, as we have
seen in lVilliamson v. Berry,supra,
declined to follow the State courtat
all, when the self same title came
before them in Suydam v. WVilliamson (I86x), 24 How. (65 U. S.) 427,
the Court held itself concluded by a
single adjudication of the State
Supreme Court, thus ignoring the
emphatic statement in Green v.
Neal's Lessee (1832), 6 Pet. (31 TT.
S.) 291, thatit would not "follow a
sing.'e adjudication but a series of
them." These cases indicate with
sufficient clearness the want of harmony in the decisions of the highest Federal tribunal on this branch
of the subject. They are absolutely
irreconcilable. I submit with all
proper deference that neither the
rule or its exceptions can be said to
be settled.
The tone of the modern decisions differs essentially from that
of the earlier. In the later cases
the binding force of State decisions is not stated in the plain
language of the earlier opinions.
Hanrick v. Patrick (1886), ii U.
S. 156, states the rule thus: "Great
weight, if not conclusive effect, is
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to be given to these decisions of the
Supreme Court of Texas." Ateriwelher v. JIfuhlenburg Co. (1887),
120 U. S. 354, speaks thus ofthedecisions of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky on a question of the or.
ganization and composition of a
tribunal of the State: "Those decisions are at least entitled to great
weight." There is a wide chasm
between decisions which are conclusive and not to be re-examined,and
those which.are entitled to great
weight. Therewill beno harmony
as to this rule, or its limitations,
until the relations of the Federal
courts to the States whose laws they
are administering, are more clearly
defined. If they are (in the State
where they sit) courts of the State
applying its laws, then they must
of course take those laws as construed and applied by the highest
tribunal of such State. To do
otherwise is to destroy all stability
and certainty in the administration
ofjustice. The fact that diversity
of citizenship gives them jurisdiction does notaffect this rule. Jurisdiction is not conferred upon the
Federal courts in controversies between citizens of different States to
protect the non-resident from the
operation and effect of the laws of
the State, but solely to insure to
him, in every State, those contractual rights and remedies which
the citizens thereof enjoy. When
citizens of different States enter
into contracts, they do so in some
State, the contracts are to be performed in some State, and the trial
court, whether Federal or State,
must apply the appropriate law of
the place of contract or of the place
of performance.
The citizen of
New York who makes a contract
with a citizen of Ohio, to be performed in either, or neither State,

